Quantum random number generation for 1.25 GHz quantum key distribution
  systems by Martin, A. et al.
Quantum random number generation for 1.25 GHz quantum key distribution systems.
A. Martin,∗ B. Sanguinetti, C. C. W. Lim, R. Houlmann, and H. Zbinden
Group of Applied Physics, University of Geneva, Switzerland
Security proofs of quantum key distribution (QKD) systems usually assume that the users have
access to source of perfect randomness. State-of-the-art QKD systems run at frequencies in the
GHz range, requiring a sustained GHz rate of generation and acquisition of quantum random num-
bers. In this paper we demonstrate such a high speed random number generator. The entropy
source is based on amplified spontaneous emission from an erbium-doped fibre, which is directly
acquired using a standard small form-factor pluggable (SFP) module. The module connects to the
Field Programmable Gate Array (FPGA) of a QKD system. A real-time randomness extractor is
implemented in the FPGA and achieves a sustained rate of 1.25 Gbps of provably random bits.
I. INTRODUCTION
Proposed in 1984, quantum key distribution (QKD) is
a cryptographic technique that allows two spatially sep-
arated users, called Alice and Bob, to exchange secret
key via a potentially insecure quantum channel. A key
advantage of QKD is that it offers provably secure cryp-
tographic keys, while classical key distribution schemes
can only offer computational security. Nowadays, own-
ing to the significant progress made in photonics tech-
nology, QKD experiments are able to distribute large
secret keys at high repetition rates [1–4]. Among the
many developments required for a fast QKD system, is
the development of a fast and practical random number
generator where the randomness is derived from quan-
tum processes [5–14]. However, the integration of these
fast quantum random number generators (QRNGs) with
fast QKD systems has remained elusive, mainly due to
the technical challenges in acquiring high data rates and
certifying that the generated numbers are truly random.
Moreover, the development of random number genera-
tor based on physical source of randomness is useful for
the classical cryptography protocols too. All the recent
social events have demonstrated that cryptography pro-
tocols using a pseudo-random number generators is not
at all secure [15].
In this paper, we demonstrate how a fast quantum
random number generator can be easily created and in-
tegrated into a communication system. In our device,
random numbers are generated by a source of ampli-
fied spontaneous emission (ASE) and acquired by a field-
programmable gate array (FPGA) using a standard small
form-factor pluggable (SFP) module. This allows us to
generate true random numbers at a rate of 1.25 Gbit/s,
as required by state-of-the-art QKD systems. In the fol-
lowing, we first describe the physical origin of the ran-
domness that our random number generation is based on.
Then, we sketch the experimental setup and detail how
each element affects the randomness of our data-stream.
Finally, we present our results, the amount of generated
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FIG. 1: Experimental setup, composed of an amplified
spontaneous emission (ASE) source, a filter, an SFP
module and an FPGA. The ASE source consists of a
back-pumped erbium doped fibre (EDF) emitting at
1530 nm. The emitted light is filtered with a bandpass
filter (50 GHz DWDM) and sent to the SFP module.
This module consists of an avalanche photodiode
(APD), which is further amplified by a transimpedance
amplifier (TIA). The signal is then “digitised” by a
limiting amplifier (LA) and sent on as a differential pair
to the FPGA. The FPGA’s receiver (RX) deserializes
the bitstream, using a stable sample clock (CLK) and
passes it to the randomness extractor. Finally, the
extracted numbers can be used by the quantum key
distribution system.
entropy and how it can be efficiently extracted.
II. SETUP OF RANDOM NUMBER
GENERATOR
The experimental setup is simple and compact, in that
it is constructed with standard telecommunications com-
ponents, as shown in FIG. 1. The randomness source
is based on a filtered ASE source followed by a small
form-factor pluggable (SFP) module plug to a field-
programmable gate array (FPGA). Below we describe
these elements, analyzing the sources of randomness and
of error.
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2A. Source ASE
The generation of quantum random numbers using
ASE has been described in detail in [16]. Here we
briefly review this method, for an ASE source based on
a pumped Erbium doped fibre.
Erbium doped fibers are employed to realize telecom-
munication wavelength amplifiers. For that, a pump laser
at 980 nm excites the erbium atoms, which are homoge-
neously distributed over the fiber. This constitutes a gain
medium, such as used in erbium-doped fibre amplifiers
(EDFAs). Each excited atoms has an equal probability
of decaying. As shown in Fig. 2, depending on the posi-
tion of this atom along the fibre, the photon will travel
a length L in the gain medium before it reaches the end
of the doped fibre. During this journey, the photon will
stimulate the emission of a number of photons propor-
tional to the exponential of L. This results in a very
large distribution of output powers, described by Bose-
Einstein statistics:
PBE(n¯, n) :=
n¯n
(1 + n¯)1+n
, (1)
where PBE(n¯, n) is the probability of finding n photons
in one mode which is populated by n¯ photons on aver-
age [17].
Atom
FIG. 2: In an erbium-doped fibre, atoms have an equal
probability of emitting a photon at any point along the
fibre. This photon will be amplified exponentially with
the distance travelled before exiting the doped fibre.
FIG. 3 shows this distribution for a mean number n¯ =
1000 photons/mode. This distribution is broad, so that
a random number can be generated by looking whether
the instantaneous intensity is above or below a specific
threshold. To certify that the collected entropy is mostly
of quantum origin, it is important that the photocurrent
distribution is much broader than the distribution due to
electrical (classical) noise. A practical source of ASE will
output approximately n¯ = 1000 photons/mode equiva-
lent to 600 nW in a 2.5 GHz bandwidth, or −32 dBm,
which is close to the noise level of receivers using an
avalanche photodiode (APD). It is possible to send a
higher number of modes onto the APD, i.e. choose an
optical signal with a spectral bandwidth larger than the
detector bandwidth by a factor m. The average number
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FIG. 3: Bose-Einstein photon number distribution for a
single-mode field. This distribution is large, so that
when discriminated by a threshold, the generated bit, 0
or 1, will depend on this distribution rather than on
electrical noise.
of photons will then grow by a factor m, and the standard
deviation, which is the value of interest to us, will grow
by a factor
√
m. In this case, the intensity distribution
is described by [17]:
PBE(n¯, n,m) =
Γ(n+m)
Γ(n+ 1) Γ(m)
(
1 +
1
n¯
)−n
(1 + n¯)−m
(2)
This distribution is plotted in FIG. 4 for a number of
modes m = 1, 10 and 40. As shown in this graph, using
a higher number of modes makes the distribution more
symmetric, which reduces bias, and increases it’s stan-
dard deviation, which makes detection easier.
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FIG. 4: Normalized photon number distribution of a
thermal state with a mean photon number of 1000, and
a number of modes M = 1, 10, 40 respectively. As the
number of modes grows, so does the standard deviation
of the distribution. A larger number of modes also
results in a more symmetric distribution.
3For our source, we employed 1 m of erbium doped fibre
(Thorlabs: ER30-4/125). The 980 nm pump laser output
of 600 mW is sufficiently strong to saturate the medium,
which allows to achieve a spectral radiance of the order of
1000 photons/mode ,equivalent to that of a 30dB ampli-
fier, and equivalent to ∼ 10µW in a 50 GHz bandwidth.
The spectral radiance of the source was calibrated using
a fibre-based radiometer [18], and is perfectly stable on
a long timescale (milliseconds to hours) [19].
B. Detection
Detection is carried out by the APD receiver of an SFP
(FTRJ1621P1BCL) module. As presented in FIG. 1,
the InGaAs APD cathode is directly connect to a trans-
impedance amplifier (TIA). At the output of the TIA, the
signal is AC coupled to a limiting amplifier (LA) which
generate the data coded as a voltage, + 400 mV and - 400
mV corresponding to a bit 1, and 0, respectively. More
precisely, for a signal greater (smaller) than the average
the LA delivers a voltage of 400 mV (-400 mV). This sig-
nal could be directly plug to an FPGA to perform the
post-processing.
The module works at a bandwidth of 2.5 GHz, which
fixes at 40 the number of modes received by the detectors.
With equation (2), the standard deviation of the number
of photons arriving on the sensor is σp = 6246, with a
mean value of 40000 (see FIG. 4). The equivalent photon
noise introduced by the detector and the electronics is
σn = 610, which is one order of magnitude smaller than
the standard deviation of the light.
III. CHARACTERIZATION AND RESULTS
First, we estimate the probability of obtaining a zero or
a one. In our configuration, the SFP automatically sets
the threshold for the discrimination with an AC coupled
limiting amplifier. To ensure that the discriminator does
not move during the time and consequently change the
statistic of our RNG, we acquired 4 × 106 blocks of 512
successive bits over a period of two days. For each block,
the number of bits 0 are counted, to construct the prob-
ability histogram reported in FIG. 5 (blue dots). More
precisely, we expect the probability to obtain k zeros in a
string of n bits to be given by the Binomial distribution
:
P (k) =
n!
k!(n− k)!P0
k(1− P0)n−k, (3)
where P0 the probability to obtain a bit 0. This func-
tion is represented by a red line in the FIG. 5, with
P0 = 0.4920 given by the mean value of the measured
data. The standard deviation of the function is given
by σT =
√
nP0(1− P0) = 11.31, which is close to the
measured value σM = 11.68(1). Roughly speaking, this
 0
 0.005
 0.01
 0.015
 0.02
 0.025
 0.03
 0.035
 0  100  200  300  400  500
P
ro
b
ab
il
it
y
Number of bit 0
 1e-08
 1e-07
 1e-06
 1e-05
 0.0001
 0.001
 0.01
 0.1
 200  300
FIG. 5: Histogram representing the probability to
obtain zeros in a block of 512 element for 4× 106
blocks. The red curve represent the statistical spread
due to the small sample size predict by the equation
(3). The insert represents the same curves in log scale.
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FIG. 6: Auto-correlation coefficient computed for a raw
and extracted sequences of 1.25 Gbits. The green line
represent the standard deviation of the correlation due
to the finale size of the sample.
shows that the underlying distribution is well approx-
imated by a Binomial distribution. In conclusion, the
probability to obtain 0 or 1 is not equiprobable—this is
due to the slight misalignment on the threshold position.
However, note that the threshold position is stable over
the acquisition time. Indeed, if the threshold position
is not stable, or if the power of the source changes dur-
ing the acquisition time, then this may lead to a broader
distribution.
Next, we compute the autocorrelation function, which
4measures the serial correlation within a data sample.
R(j) =
〈X0Xj〉 − 〈X0〉〈Xj〉√
(〈X20 〉 − 〈X0〉2)
(〈X2j 〉 − 〈Xj〉2) , (4)
where 〈·〉 denotes the proportion of ones, and X0 and Xj
represent a bit string X[0,n] and X[j,n+j], respectively.
The red curve in FIG. 6 represent this function obtain for
a string of 1.25×109 successive bits. The correlations are
not negligible, therefore we cannot model the data with
an iid (independent and identically distributed) process.
To get a bound on the min-entropy of the source, we con-
sider a Santha-Vazirani type of weak source of random-
ness [20, 21], which generates a sequence of weak random
bits where the probability distribution of each bit, con-
ditioned on the previously generated bits, is bounded by
some fixed real parameter 0 < δ ≤ 1/2. In particular,
let the X1, X2, . . . , Xn be a sequence of n random bits
generated by the Santha-Vazirani source, then for each
0 ≤ i < n
δ ≤ P (Xi+1 = xi+1|Xi = xi, . . . , X1 = x1) ≤ 1− δ. (5)
For this type of source, the min-entropy is bounded by
Hmin(X1 . . . Xn) ≥ −log2((1−δ)n). Here, it is important
to note that the min-entropy measures the number of
extractable random bits from the sequence of n weakly
random bits.
One approach to estimate the value of δ consists in us-
ing the correlation coefficient. The stronger correlation is
obtained for j = 1 with R(1) = 0.13078 and all the other
is at least one order of magnitude smaller. With the cor-
relation coefficient, we calculate the mutual information
given by I(X1, X2) =
1
2 ln
(
1−R(1)2), and the condi-
tional entropy H(X1|X0) = H(X0)−I(X0, X1) = 0.9912
for P0 estimate in the previous section. To estimate the
min-entropy, we compute the greatest conditional prob-
ability satisfying the conditional entropy defined in pre-
vious equation, which corresponds to max(P (x1|x0)) =
0.5775 and δ = 0.4225. This approach allows to correctly
estimate the bound of the min-entropy for n=2, but for
n ≥ 2 we assume that only two successive bits are corre-
lated.
To improve the estimation of δ, we can calculate the
conditional probability when we know more bits, which
is given by
P (Xi = xi|X1 = x1...Xi−1 = xi−1)
=
P (X1 = x1...Xi−1 = xi−1, Xi = xi)
P (X1 = x1...Xi−1 = xi−1)
.
The maximum conditional probability as function of i
obtained by this method is shown in FIG. 7 a). These
values are calculated from a string of 5 × 109 bits. We
can remark that the estimation of δ with the previous
method is not accurate for i ≥ 2. Furthermore, with
this approach, for i large, the error introduced by the
finite size of the sample used to estimate the conditional
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FIG. 7: a) Maximal conditional probability measures
from 5× 109 bits as the function of the number of
known bits. b) Min-entropy as a function of the string
length i.
probability are no longer negligible. More precisely, for i
larger than 10 the results are not conclusive. For i=10,
we obtain δ = 0.4114.
To verify if the estimation the estimation of delta
is correct, we compute the min-entropy of 5 Gbit
for different string size n, i.e. Hmin(X1 . . . Xn) =
−log2(max(P (Xn...X0)), as show the FIG. 7 b). More-
over, the lines represent the min-entropy value for two
different δ. For δ = 0.4225, K is greater than the
computed Hmin the large n, which is not the case for
δ = 0.4114. As shown FIG.6, the correlation coefficient
after 20 bits are the order of 10−3, we could assume the
δ = 0.4114 verify the equation (5) ∀n.
To improve the min-entropy per bit, an extractor is
implement in the FPGA based bit-matrix-vector multi-
plication with a random matrix[22, 23]. The extractor
uses raw sequence of 512 bits to generate 256 extracted
bits, by multiplying the raw sequence with the random
matrix of size 512× 256 generated by a QRNG Quantis.
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FIG. 8: Dieharder test of the data at the output of the
extractor. For each test the represented p-value is the
result of a Kolmogorov-Smirnov test of 100 p-values. To
pass the test the p-value needs to satisfy
0.01 ≤ p ≤ 0.99 [24].
In principle, with the min-entropy of the physical random
generator, we could generated at least 391 bits per cycle.
We choose to generate only 256 bits per cycle to obtain a
frequency of 1.25 GHz. Moreover, a greater compression
factor ensure the generation of a near perfect random bit
string.
To characterize the randomness of the extracted bit
string, we first calculated the probability to obtain a bit
0 after 1 s of measurement, P e0 = 0.500001(15). Then,
we computed as for the raw data the autocorrelation co-
efficient, the conditional probability and the min-entropy
(see FIG. 6 and 7). As shows all these measurements con-
firm the good randomness of the bits after the extractor.
Moreover, the FIG. 8 present some test results obtained
with the extracted data. Note that, all the Diehard tests
are successfully passed.
IV. CONCLUSION
In this paper we present a random number generator
based on the statistics of a ASE source implemented in
an erbium doped fibre. In addition to the completely
fibered source of light, our generator takes advantage of
a SFP module and an FPGA which makes compact, in-
trinsically stable, and standalone. Indeed, the implemen-
tation of all the post-processing inside the FPGA allows
us to generate a random data flow of 1.25 Gb/s in real
time. Our proposal has the benefit that it can be easily
upgraded to a higher throughput, e.g., 10 Gbit/s simply
by using a faster “SFP+” module.
This generator is an excellent candidate to generate the
random numbers necessary during the implementation of
commercial quantum key distribution based on protocols
such as COW or BB84.
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